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KOSYGIN. Absolutely. I will come
here tomorrow morning and do everything.
KIRILENKO. We must undertake
measures to ensure that all of the military
supplies are sent in March.
KOSYGIN. And if, as Comrade
Ustinov has pointed out, it is impossible to
ship everything completely in March, then
perhaps, a second portion can remain for
April, but let that portion be insignificantly
I also want to raise another question:
whatever you may say, Amin and Taraki
alike are concealing from us the true state
of affairs. We still don’t know exactly what
is happening in Afghanistan. What is their
assessment of the situation? After all, they
continue to paint the picture in a cheerful
light, whereas in reality, we can see what is
happening there. They are good people, that
is apparent, but all the same they are con-
cealing a great deal from us. What is the
reason for this, that is hard to say. In my
view we must decide this question with the
[Gromyko], as soon as possible. Although
as a practical matter he is not authorized,
and he doesn’t do what is required of him.
In addition, I would consider it neces-
sary to send an additional number of quali-
fied military specialists, and let them find
out what is happening with the army.
Moreover, I would consider it neces-
sary to adopt a more comprehensive politi-
cal decision. Perhaps the draft of such a
political decision can be prepared by our
comrades in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of Defense, or the Foreign De-
partment of the KGB. It is clear that Iran,
China, and Pakistan will come out against
Afghanistan, and do everything within their
power and means to contravene the lawful
government and discredit its actions. It is
exactly here that our political support of
Taraki and his government is necessary. And
of course, Carter will also come out against
the leadership of Afghanistan.
With whom will it be necessary for us
to fight in the event it becomes necessary to
deploy troops - who will it be that rises
against the present leadership of Afghani-
stan? They are all Mohammedans, people
of one belief, and their faith is sufficiently
strong that they can close ranks on that ba-
sis. It seems to me that we must speak to
Taraki and Amin about the mistakes that
they have permitted to occur during this
time. In reality, even up to the present time,
they have continued to execute people that
do not agree with them; they have killed al-
most all of the leaders - not only the top lead-
ers, but also those of the middle ranks - of
the “Parcham” party. Of course, it will now
be difficult to formulate a political document
- to do that our comrades will be required to
work, as I have already said, for a period of
three days.
USTINOV. That is all correct, what
Aleksey Nikolaevich [Kosygin] says, this
must be done as soon as possible.
GROMYKO. The documents must be
prepared immediately.
KOSYGIN. I don’t think that we
should pressure the Afghan government to
request a deployment of forces from us. Let
them create their own special units, which
could be redeployed to the more difficult
regions in order to quell the insurgents.
USTINOV. In my view we must not,
under any circumstances, mix our forces
with the Afghan forces, in the event that we
send them there.
KOSYGIN. We must prepare our own
military forces, work up a statement relat-
ing to them, and send it by special messen-
USTINOV. We have prepared two
options in respect to military action. Under
the first one, we would, in the course of a
single day, deploy into Afghanistan the
105th airborne division and redeploy the
infantry-motorized regiment into Kabul;
toward the border we would place the 68th
motorized division; and the 5th motor artil-
lery division would be located at the bor-
der. Under this scenario, we would be ready
for the deployment of forces within three
days. But we must adopt the political deci-
sion that we have been talking about here.
KIRILENKO. Comrade Ustinov has
correctly stated the issue; we must come out
against the insurgents. And in the political [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]